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I   Introduction
Spinoza developed a highly interesting metaphysical theory of nature 
and individuality. In this paper, I endeavor to bring forward some ideas 
on how Spinozistic views on extended substance, physical world, and 
individuality can be approached using the concept of power as the basis 
of interpretation. Jonathan Bennett’s ‘fi eld metaphysical’ interpretation 
of Spinoza’s doctrine of one extended substance has generated much 
discussion, and forms the other starting point of my paper. I believe 
that the fi eld metaphysical interpretation enables one to deal with the 
central questions concerning physical individuation — individuality 
and the persistence of individual being — in a rather novel way. My 
main question is this: what follows if physical individuals are seen as 
parts of a unifi ed fi eld of extended power?
I will begin by presenting some general features of my interpretation 
of Spinozistic substance and fi nite things as power. After these remarks 
concerning the basis of Spinozistic thought, I will expound the philo-
sophical problems Bennett’s fi eld metaphysical interpretation solves 
and show how his position can be combined with the view that takes 
the ontological principle of power as the point of departure in interpret-
ing Spinoza’s thought. Following this discussion of Spinozistic ontol-
ogy, I will offer an analysis of the relation between the metaphysical 
and physical points of view in the Ethics. Lastly, I shall explicate how 
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the question concerning fi nite individuals’ persistence can be answered 
from my position. I will argue that when interpreted using power as the 
key concept, Spinoza’s theory of extended substance and individuality 
appears not only quite coherent and intelligible, but also much more 
exciting than has often been thought; indeed, keeping in view how 
important the idea of describing human existence in dynamic terms is 
for our philosophical heritage (one must only consider such thinkers 
as Leibniz, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche), these aspects of Spinozism 
merit our serious attention.
II   Substance and fi nite things as power
As is well known, Spinoza argues in the fi rst part of the Ethics that there 
is only one substance, namely God (E1p14),1 and that this substance 
exists necessarily (E1p11). His argument for the necessity of God’s ex-
istence has been much debated, and its analysis is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Instead, I would like to turn to the question concerning 
God’s nature, for it should be asked what kind of being this necessarily 
existing God could be. That is, how can we describe more positively 
the being that is the cause of itself? The crucial characterization can be 
found in E1p34: ‘God’s power [potentia] is his essence itself.’2 This can 
be seen as the cornerstone of Spinozistic dynamism, in which the na-
ture of the necessarily existing God is power. Spinoza need not be seen 
here as guilty of some kind of obscurantism in the sense of presenting 
an occult quality of power he should rather be trying to eliminate. In-
stead, we should take a look at his reasons for E1p34 from that propo-
sition’s demonstration: ‘For from the necessity alone of God’s essence 
it follows that God is the cause of himself (by p11) and (by p16 and 
 1 I have used the following method in referring to the Ethics: a = axiom, app = ap-
pendix, c = corollary, d = defi nition (when not after a proposition number), d = 
demonstration (when after a proposition number), le = lemma, p = proposition, 
pref = preface, s = scholium. For instance, E1p8s2 refers to the second scholium of 
the eighth proposition in the fi rst part of the Ethics.
 2 E1d6, ‘[b]y God I understand a being absolutely infi nite, i.e., a substance consist-
ing of infi nity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infi nite 
essence,’ expresses, of course, Spinoza’s fundamental view on God’s nature. 
However, he speaks about God’s essence as power, too, and my aim here is to 
examine the implications of that identifi cation and its connection to E1d6. Spinoza 
identifi es God’s power and essence already in Descartes’ ‘Principles of Philosophy’ 
where he notes, after using them interchangeably, that ‘the power by which the 
substance preserves itself is nothing but its essence, and differs from it only in 
name’ (DPP1p7s).
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p16c) of all things.’ In other words, Spinoza claims that since — as the 
crucial E1p16 states — things are what they are and the way they are 
because everything there is follows, with geometrical necessity, from 
God’s essence, this essence is to be identifi ed with power. Now, what 
is the rationale behind this? I would suggest that the identifi cation of 
essence and power has to do with the fact that from E1p16 onwards 
Spinoza discusses the nature of causality, and he clearly fi nds ‘power’ 
to be a suitable term for characterizing it; talk about causality can be, as 
it were, translated into talk about power. To be able to cause effects is to 
be powerful, and therefore the all-causing God’s essence equals power. 
The connection between the interrelated concepts of essence, causality, 
and power can be summed up by saying that, in general in the Ethics, 
power means being able to cause effects, and since things cause effects 
in virtue of their essences (see e.g. E1p16, 1p36, 3p7, d), essences are 
intrinsically powerful. The basic case of God is, of course, the most im-
portant one, for God’s essence is ultimately responsible for everything 
there is. And as attributes constitute it (E1d4, 1d6), it is understandable 
that, for Spinoza, they cannot be inert like Cartesian extension is; in-
stead, they are capable of producing all the modifi cations falling under 
them. That is probably why Spinoza writes in his correspondence that 
‘from Extension as conceived by Descartes, to wit, an inert mass, it is 
not only diffi cult … but quite impossible to demonstrate the existence 
of bodies.’ (Ep81)3 The concept of power evokes this dynamistic aspect 
of the Spinozistic attributes and what may be called the essentialist 
model of causal activity on which the system is built.4
Spinoza’s thinking in E1p34 can be seen as an instance of his explana-
tory rationalism: there must be an ultimate explanation for being in 
general and for being of each thing in particular (see E1p11d). Con-
cerning the issues discussed thus far, this line of thinking leads, to my 
lights at least, Spinoza to the idea that everything possible is necessary, 
and the realization of these possibilities requires power. Consequently, 
all existence has what may be called substantial power of existing as its 
basis.5 This interpretation fi nds support from E1p11, especially from 
its second alternative demonstration, where Spinoza states that ‘to be 
able to exist is to have power.’ Also in E1p11s, Spinoza claims that ‘an 
 3 For more on Ep81 and 83, see below.
 4 In this he is, in part, following the tradition: as Wolfson (1961 [1934], I, 403, 405) 
explains, the Medievals characterized God’s causality by three attributes: intellect, 
will, and power. But in the Ethics only power is identifi ed with essence, whereas 
intellect and will are merely modes of substance.
 5 See also Pietarinen, 2000a, 196; 2000b, 67; 2003, 141.
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absolutely infi nite Being, or God, has, of himself, an absolutely infi nite 
power of existing.’ This means that in Spinozistic ontology power plays 
a key role, grounding all being: accordingly, Spinoza identifi es reality, 
power, and perfection with each other (see E1p11s, 2d6).
As far as fi nite beings are concerned, Spinoza states in E1p34d what 
follows from this fundamental power of the only substance: all things 
are and act by the power of God. Finite beings are modes or affections 
of substance — that is, expressions of God’s attributes (E1p25c) — and 
hence expressions of substantial power under different attributes. This 
means that each singular thing is a part of God’s infi nite power (E4p4d) 
and expresses this power of God in a certain and determinate way 
(E3p6d). As Margaret Wilson remarks, it is important to make the often 
overlooked distinction between modal existence purely as essence (‘in 
the attributes of God’) and modal existence in time and place (‘under 
duration,’ that is, ‘actually’).6 A thing’s portion of God’s power is its 
essence (E3p6d, 3p7), and essences exist eternally, atemporally, in God 
(see E2p8, 5p22, 5p23).
However, although substantial power is the effi cient cause of the es-
sence of a singular thing (E1p25), the reason for temporal existence of 
any fi nite mode cannot be its essence (E1p24): Spinoza claims that fi nite 
modes can become actual only through the effects of other actual fi nite 
modes (E1p28). This means that the beginning of the actual being of a 
mode depends on the infi nite totality of modes — that is, the chain of 
causes and effects that continues without end — and not on the eternal 
essence of the mode.
I believe that the concept of power must be taken seriously in order to 
understand the overall construction of Spinoza’s philosophy. His phi-
losophy of power is particularly strongly at work in the third and fourth 
parts of the Ethics, where he deals with temporal individual existence: 
emotions and our basic nature are defi ned in terms of power (E3d3, 3p6, 
3p7). In connection with this, it should be kept in mind that the question 
of motion and its persistence forms an important part of the background 
for seventeenth century philosophy. Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and 
Leibniz all wanted to explain philosophically the new law of motion 
asserting that if a body moves, it will continue to move unless it is af-
fected by external causes. Seen in this context, Spinozistic metaphysics 
of power is one answer to the essential problem of motion. However, 
this brief outline of substance and fi nite things must suffi ce for my pres-
ent concerns, and I will now move on to analyzing its implications for 
Spinoza’s theory of substance under the attribute of extension.
6  Wilson, 1996, 97
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III   Field metaphysic of power
1.  Bennett’s fi eld metaphysical interpretation of extended substance
Bennett presented his groundbreaking fi eld metaphysical interpreta-
tion of extended substance in A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, published in 
1984. Although similar views of Spinoza’s metaphysics had been ex-
pressed earlier, Bennett was the fi rst to give this line of thought a philo-
sophically elaborated form.7 After expounding his interpretation I will 
examine it in connection with the idea of substantial power.
Bennett calls substance expressed under the attribute of extension, or 
the one extended substance, space. As he explains, the need for partless 
substances stems from the seventeenth-century view that substances 
must be causally and conceptually independent. If a substance consist-
ed of (substantial) parts, it would be ontologically dependent on those 
parts, and therefore would no longer be a substance. This requirement 
creates diffi culties especially in the case of extended substances, since it 
was commonly held that every physical object is always divisible into 
separate parts.8 On the other hand, as Martial Gueroult notes, infi nite 
extension and divisibility were traditionally thought to exclude each 
other, and the idea of infi nite extension was rejected. But this was not 
Spinoza’s approach; he holds on to infi nity and rejects divisibility.9 What 
Bennett calls ‘fi eld metaphysic’ should be seen as a solution to the prob-
lems pertaining to the monistic idea of extension as substance: if there 
really is only a single extended, ontologically independent and unifi ed 
substance, how should we understand the basic nature of all the diver-
gent physical entities we are familiar with? How to explicate the rela-
tion between physical bodies and space as a whole? This is precisely the 
problem addressed in the very important E1p15s. Spinoza makes there 
a distinction between two ways of conceiving extended nature. He 
claims that those who are inclined to divide extension attend to it only 
superfi cially, as it appears to our senses, and consequently fi nd it to be 
composed of parts. But if the intellect attends to extended nature as a 
substance, Spinoza insists that ‘it will be found to be infi nite, unique, 
 7 For texts at least suggesting a fi eld metaphysical interpretation of Spinozistic ex-
tension, see Harris, 1973, 50-6, 65, 68-9; Lachterman, 1978, 103; Sachs, 1976, 130-1; 
Van Zandt, 1986, 255-60; von Dunin Borkowski, 1933, 97–101; Wolf, 1974 (1927), 21-
4. For a discussion of Spinozism and Bennett’s interpretation as space-holism, see 
Esfeld, 2002, 213-38. For a recent attempt to combine Spinozistic fi eld metaphysic 
with Kantian transcendental philosophy, see Rohs, 1996.
 8 Bennett, 1984, 82-3; see also Bennett, 1996, 62-3. 
 9 Gueroult, 1968, 214-15
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and indivisible’ (E1p15s). Thus Spinozistic space is a unity: it cannot be 
divided in the sense of having really distinct parts. According to Ben-
nett, Spinoza can defend this idea of unifi ed space, not constituted by 
its parts, in the following way:
[T]he thought of a whole space is not built up out of thoughts of its subregions, 
whereas the thought of any fi nite region of space must involve the thought of a 
larger region — or the whole of space — within which it is embedded. … [T]he 
very concept of spatial region involves the concept of the space of which it is a 
region.10
In other words, no part of space can exist, or be understood, without 
relation to the space as a whole, and hence its parts cannot be really dis-
tinct from each other. Obviously, this tells us something decisive about 
the meaning of Spinoza’s assertion that ‘nothing can be or be conceived 
without God’ of E1p15. 
So if unifi ed space is the only substantial extended entity there is, 
what should we say about fi nite things? Here, of course, the doctrine 
of substance and its modes comes to the fore. As mentioned above, for 
Spinoza fi nite things are modes, that is, affections or states of substance 
that can neither be, nor be conceived, apart from substance. Conse-
quently, although extended substance cannot strictly speaking be di-
vided, it is not altogether without distinctions:
[M]atter is everywhere the same, and … parts are distinguished in it only insofar 
as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distin-
guished only modally, but not really. (E1p15s)
In other words, the variety of material phenomena results from the 
one substance being affected in infi nitely many ways. As has been fre-
quently pointed out, not having substantially distinct parts does not 
prevent substance from having modally distinct parts. But what does 
it mean to be ‘modally distinguished,’ or ‘an affection of substance’? 
This question can be answered by the fi eld metaphysical account: the 
regions of the whole space can become many different kinds of quali-
ties in such a way that statements about material bodies can be reduced 
to statements about space.11 More exactly, each particular body must be 
10 Bennett, 1984, 86
11 It should be noted that despite talking, for practical reasons, about spatial regions, 
Bennett (2001, 143) consistently stresses that ‘regions depend for their existence on 
the existence of Space as a whole;’ accordingly, he is not guilty of treating regions 
of space as basic things. Moreover, he does not quantify over them: by using adjec-
tives and adverbs the fi eld metaphysical account can be given without mentioning 
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associated with a spatio-temporally continuous string of place-times. 
The central idea is that bodily objects must be logical constructions out 
of strings of place-times, for Spinoza’s basic ontology does not contain 
physical objects. According to Bennett, this makes bodies adjectival to 
regions of space; all the statements about bodies can at least in principle 
be expressed in terms of ‘how Space is.’12
As a result it follows that what we see as a distinct material thing, 
for example as a chair, is more adequately conceived as a certain spa-
tial region being ‘chairy*,’ that is, having that modal property of space 
which we conceptualize at the physical level — ‘one level up’ from the 
fi eld metaphysical one — as a chair. Moreover, Bennett claims that what 
we would ordinarily call movement of a body is not literally speaking 
movement, but simply an alteration in which spatial regions have the 
property we conceptualize as the body.13 For example, if we move a 
chair, there is a continuous change in which spatial regions are chairy*. 
Or as Bennett himself puts it, ‘Spinoza’s view is that the movement of 
things or stuff is, deep down, the passing along of something qualita-
tive — a change in which regions are F and which are not, for suitable 
values of F.’14 Since metaphysically speaking there is only one ‘thing,’ 
the whole extended world, there cannot be moving bodies, either; con-
sequently, Bennett holds that motion ordinarily understood does not 
belong to Spinozistic ontology.15
According to this kind of fi eld metaphysic, the destruction of a fi nite 
individual does not amount to the annihilation of a certain region of 
extended substance, but only to spatial alteration. This is in complete 
agreement with the following important passage of the Ethics:
For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one 
another — insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal substance. For 
insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar 
regions (Bennett, 1984, 95; 2001, 143). Nevertheless, Bennett (1984, 95-6; 1991, 55-6) 
is probably right in holding that a complete account of the world must involve 
indexical adverbs such as ‘here’ and ‘there,’ for otherwise genuine reference to 
particulars becomes impossible, and it certainly seems hard to fi nd room for in-
dexicality in Spinoza’s system. However, because any interpretation of Spinoza’s 
monism must face the problem of indexicality, it poses no particular threat to the 
fi eld metaphysical interpretation.
12 Bennett, 1984, 89, 92, 95-6; 2001, 143-4
13 Bennett, 1984, 96, 106-7; 1996, 71
14 Bennett, 1984, 89-90
15 Bennett, 2001, 143, 148; 1984, 90, 106
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as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither 
generated nor corrupted. (E1p15s)
In other words, despite the fact that material things can be driven out 
of existence, space itself cannot be annihilated. Furthermore, as Bennett 
points out, a rather perplexing statement in letter 4 makes sense from 
the fi eld metaphysical point of view: ‘[I]f one part of matter were to 
be annihilated, the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same 
time’ (Ep4).16 That is, if extended substance as space forms one unifi ed 
fi eld, then annihilation of one part of it would amount to the total an-
nihilation of the whole fi eld — and hence there can be no vacuum in the 
sense that a part of space would cease to exist.17 This is not what hap-
pens when bodies go out of existence. In Bennett’s terms, for example 
a chair’s destruction means that a region ceases to be chairy* and no 
adjoining region becomes chairy*. Briefl y said, ‘nothing goes out of ex-
istence, but something alters.’18
2.  Field metaphysic and substantial power
As one would expect, Bennett’s fi eld metaphysical interpretation has 
had its share of criticism as well. Most notable is the one presented by 
Edwin Curley. After fi nding Bennett’s account of the relation between 
fi eld metaphysical and physical level unconvincing, Curley sums up his 
sentiments in a direct manner: ‘In this respect Bennett seems to me to be 
engaging in speculative reinterpretation rather than in interpretation.’19 
It is true that Bennett’s view is in many ways radical, but before writing 
it off as simply anachronistic one should think over how well it handles 
the texts presented above, some of the trickiest passages Spinoza ever 
wrote. Moreover, there is a genuine philosophical problem — namely, 
16 Bennett (1984, 98) claims that apart from his interpretation, he cannot fi nd any 
other basis on which this piece of text would be ‘even sane.’ However, for another 
interpretation of it that does not strike me as outright unintelligible, see Gueroult, 
1968, 216.
17 Bennett, 1984, 97-102. In other words, from the Spinozistic point of view ‘vacuum’ 
is a nonsense term, an ‘extended nothing’ (Bennett, 1984, 100). Cf. Lecrivain, 1986, 
37-8.
18 Bennett, 1996, 71
19 Curley, 1991, 44. It should be noted that Bennett (1991, 56-7; 2001, 147-8) answers 
this criticism by arguing very convincingly about the nature of metaphysics and 
its difference to physics. Although Spinoza’s physics is about matter in motion, this 
does not mean that his metaphysics could not be about something fundamentally 
different (and I think that it certainly is).
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how should the character of fi nite physical entities be understood in 
substance monism that applies to extension — that can be answered by 
interpreting Spinoza the way Bennett does.20 Indeed, it seems obvious 
to me that Spinoza’s thinking about these matters remained relatively 
stable at least since the early Short Treatise. Consider the following pas-
sages: ‘[N]o parts of it [extension] could be understood separately.’ (KV 
I.ii, § 19.2) ‘[D]ivision never occurs in the substance, but always and 
only in the modes of the substance. So if I divide water, I divide only the 
mode of the substance, not the substance itself.’ (KV I.ii, § 21) ‘[W]hen 
we say that a man perishes, or is destroyed, that is only understood of 
the man insofar as he is a composite thing and mode of substance, and 
not the substance itself on which he depends.’ (KV I.ii, § 22) These pas-
sages show that Spinoza thought long and hard about issues related to 
fi eld metaphysic.
Bennett notes that fi eld metaphysic does not necessarily lead to phys-
ics of material particles, and he suggests that the best way to under-
stand what is meant by ‘an occupant of space’ might be to replace the 
concept of a physical thing with the concept of a force or a wave.21 True 
as this is, I think the question can also be posed the other way round: 
instead of asking what kind of physics can be combined with fi eld meta-
physic, it can be asked what kind of view of the basic nature of substance 
can be combined with the fi eld metaphysical character of extension. 
Consequently, I want to take essential substantial power as the starting 
point and see how well it fares in connection with fi eld metaphysic. Al-
though Bennett admits that it is important for Spinoza to see ‘the world 
as somehow self-moving, perhaps like an animal,’ he does not develop 
this theme any further, since he cannot ‘make it yield interesting phi-
losophy.’22 Generally speaking, the concept of power does not occupy 
an important position in Bennett’s studies of Spinoza.
I would like to further elaborate on Bennett’s account by moving to 
a more dynamic frame of mind in which substance is regarded as sub-
stantial power realizing the necessitarianism Spinoza’s system implies. 
It should be noticed that many French Spinoza scholars have under-
20 Bennett (1991, 54-5; 2001, 145-6) points out that he and Curley probably differ in 
their general view of what kind of thinker Spinoza is — Bennett picturing him 
as bolder and more reckless than Curley does. This claim holds water, but is no 
argument for the fi eld metaphysical interpretation, not the least because the bold-
ness and originality of Spinoza as a thinker is largely determined by what kind of 
overall interpretation of his metaphysical writings one accepts.
21 Bennett, 1984, 106
22 Bennett, 1984, 107. Interestingly enough, at one point Gueroult (1974, 177) claims 
that in Spinozistic material universe everything is ‘animal-machine.’
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stood this active nature of substance. Just to name a couple of more 
classic writers: according to Matheron, extension is pure spatial activity 
that produces the modes;23 Deleuze calls substance absolutely infi nite 
power of existing in all forms;24 and Gueroult concludes that for Spi-
noza extension is not inert mass, but an attribute that has power both of 
self-production and of production of modes.25 
When this notion of extension as a form of substantial power is com-
bined with Bennett’s view of extension as unifi ed fi eld of space, it can 
be seen that they fi t very nicely together. The result is the idea of space 
as one unifi ed fi eld of spatial power. Thus, seen from the dynamic point 
of view, extended power forms a spatial continuum with no autono-
mous, really distinct parts. Substantial power is a fundamental unity, 
and consequently, in ontological terms it is not correct to refer to fi nite 
entities without relating them to the whole substantial power, without 
seeing them as parts of one power (cf. E4p4d). I want to stress that I 
accept the core of the above discussed fi eld metaphysical thesis: space 
can be modifi ed in many ways and from this result the innumerable 
phenomena of the physical world. However, what is essential to my 
approach is to pose the question concerning extended substance and 
modes in terms of power and its states. What kind of states or affections 
could there be in spatial power? Now, it is fundamentally right to hold 
that the relationship between substance and modes is not merely one of 
causal dependence in the sense that modes are produced by substance, 
but also one of inherence in the sense that modes exist in substance.26 
Here the metaphor of sea and its waves is, to my mind, enlightening: as 
waves cannot exist other than as parts of a sea, the sea is always wavy 
in a certain way, in some wave state; and each idea of a wave involves 
an idea of the sea, just as any idea of a physical thing involves the idea 
of extension. Further, substance as power is no static thing, and con-
sequently its affections should not be seen in the mold of properties 
of everyday things. Since modally distinguished parts constitute dif-
fering amounts of God’s power, I suggest that under the attribute of 
extension we are dealing with differences in power distribution in the 
spatial fi eld: fi nite entities are, fi eld metaphysically speaking, consti-
tuted by differences in the intensity or strength of spatial power. These 
distributive differences in intensity form relatively stable spatial patterns 
23 Matheron, 1988 (1969), 13; see also Matheron, 1988 (1969), 14, 16, 21, 26, 30.
24 Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 198; see also Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 90-5.
25 Gueroult, 1974, 189; see also Gueroult, 1974, 150-1, 188.
26 For an excellent treatment of this topic, see Carriero, 1995.
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or formations, i.e. modes of extension. This is what it means for them to 
be parts of substantial power.27 There is no region without power, since 
that would equal total annihilation of extension, but there are drastic 
differences in the intensity of power between spatial regions, and out 
of these differences fi nite things are constituted.
Hence, the material bodies we encounter in the physical world are 
ontologically speaking modifi cations of spatial power; seen from the 
metaphysical standpoint there are only spatially distributed alterations 
in power. Consequently, motion and change of a physical body are al-
terations in the one extended fi eld of power — alterations in which re-
gions carry such a pattern of intensity that a certain material body is 
thereby constituted. And following Bennett’s analysis, a fi nite mode’s 
destruction cannot mean annihilation of power, but only such an altera-
tion in it that no region carries anymore the formation of intensity that 
equals the mode ontologically described. Hence, claims about material 
bodies are, deep down, not just claims about space, but claims about 
spatially distributed intensities of power.
To back up my claims I would like to bring forward some textual 
evidence, some of which I mentioned already in the beginning of this 
paper. Spinoza’s dynamic conception of space can be found in the fol-
lowing passage that has sometimes been considered to be quite cryp-
tic:28
[F]rom Extension as conceived by Descartes, to wit, an inert mass, it is not only 
diffi cult … but quite impossible to demonstrate the existence of bodies. For matter 
at rest, as far as in it lies, will continue to be at rest, and will not be set in motion 
except by a more powerful external cause. For this reason I have not hesitated on 
a previous occasion to affi rm that Descartes’ principles of natural things are of no 
service, not to say quite wrong. (Ep81)
Still more important is the highly exciting passage included in the next 
letter he sent to Tschirnhaus:
With regard to your question as to whether the variety of things can be demon-
strated a priori solely from the conception of Extension, I think I have already 
made it clear that this is impossible. That is why Descartes is wrong in defi ning 
matter through Extension; it must necessarily be explicated through an attribute which 
expresses eternal and infi nite essence. (Ep83; emphasis added)
27 Cf. Deleuze (1997 [1968], 227), ‘the very idea of the mode is … the only way show-
ing how things “participate” in God’s power, that is, how they are parts of divine 
power.’
28 See Curley, 1991, 51.
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I think that these passages strongly point to the direction of my inter-
pretation. To be more exact, two central points can be extracted from 
them: fi rstly, extension should not be thought of as inert mass (Ep81); 
secondly, matter cannot be derived from the concept of extension alone, 
but follows from an attribute which expresses God’s essence (Ep83), i.e. 
his power (E1p34). Letter 83 especially challenges many traditional 
interpretations of matter, extension, and substance in Spinoza’s ontol-
ogy. And saying that matter cannot be defi ned solely through extension 
speaks against Bennett’s position, according to which the concept of 
mass should be constructed out of properties of spatial regions29 — i.e. 
from properties of the one extended substance. Yet letter 83 explicitly 
denies this kind of ‘defi ning matter through Extension.’ Spinoza seems 
to imply that something more fundamental than matter or extension 
is involved here, and my claim is that he is pointing precisely to the 
nature of substance as active power; this is what Spinoza means when 
speaks (in his idiom) of matter being ‘explicated through an attribute 
which expresses eternal and infi nite essence’ (Ep83). The point is that 
since extension (as an attribute) expresses God’s essence or power, mat-
ter should be understood through a dynamic conception of extension, 
that is, through active extension that needs nothing external to itself to 
generate the variety of corporeal things.30 This kind of extension can be 
said to have an internal principle of change;31 it is not a realm of inert 
entities but a whole in which intrinsically striving entities — one could 
say strivers of different sorts — endeavor to occupy regions of exten-
sion. And these internally produced strivings lead to changes in the 
extended world.32
So, I hold that in Spinoza’s monism spatial patterns of intensity pro-
duce the variety we experience as material things and their properties.33 
29 Bennett, 1984, 90
30 For an enlightening recent discussion of these letters that agrees with mine, see 
Della Rocca, 2003, 225-6. For an informative account of the important concept of 
expression, see Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 13-22, 169-86.
31 For this formulation I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal.
32 For more on the doctrine of striving (conatus), see below.
33 Bennett (1984, 89) and Olli Koistinen (1991, 51) suggest that physical things are 
regions of space suitably thickened. I do not think their position is totally unlike 
mine, for gradations of intensity in the fi eld of power can be seen as resulting 
in material objects as ‘thickenings’ of extension. However, Bennett (1984, 93–4) 
thinks that individual things are properties of God and as such honest universals, 
whereas Koistinen (1991, 80–1) holds that they are particular states of God, that 
is, exemplifi cations of properties by God and hence entities that consist both of 
substance and a property.
Field Metaphysic, Power, and Individuation in Spinoza 405
Moreover, seeing modes as gradually differing intensities explains why 
Spinoza clearly thinks of reality and existence quantitatively: a thing 
can be more or less real and perfect, have more or less being and pow-
er (see E1p9, 1p11d, 1p11s). In other words, instead of understanding 
existence as either–or, Spinoza thinks of it in the axis of more–less.34 
Bennett, however, sees a problem in the status of motion in Spinoza’s 
system. Spinoza thinks that motion and rest generate the variety in the 
physical world (E2p13le1), ‘motion and rest’ being the immediate in-
fi nite mode of extension (Ep64), but since according to Bennett’s fi eld 
metaphysical position no thing moves, there is no ‘movement literally 
so-called’ in the spatial fi eld at all.35 Thus it would seem rather unclear 
what we should make of motion (and rest) from the fi eld metaphysi-
cal point of view. However, I think that this diffi culty is quite solvable: 
there is nothing problematic about spatial fi eld of power being divided 
or patterned in regard to motion and rest — since patterns of intensifi -
cations are extended they can occupy varying regions of spatial fi eld, 
i.e., they can move. To think of motion as intensifi cations fi lling dif-
ferent regions in the space-fi eld at different times may be unlike our 
everyday conception of motion, but we are still here dealing with mo-
tion, only this time motion fi eld metaphysically described. This way 
interpreted, ‘motion and rest’ refers to the fact that the spatio-temporal 
fi eld undergoes changes ceaselessly, for the substantial power is con-
tinually redistributed between regions of space. What is more, arrange-
ment, re-arrangement, and motion of spatial intensifi cations of power 
necessarily obey the laws of God’s essence, as the assertion ‘since the 
nature of the universe … is absolutely infi nite, its parts are controlled by 
the nature of this infi nite power in infi nite ways, and are compelled to un-
dergo infi nite variations’ (Ep32; translation modifi ed, emphasis added) 
makes clear.
To summarize: Bennett succeeds in giving an insightful account of 
an important aspect of extended substance, namely its unifi ed fi eld 
character. However, it does not follow from this that fi eld metaphysic 
would be all there is to say about Spinozistic substance. Although fi eld 
34 It may not be totally uninteresting to note that Bennett (1984, 104) ponders wheth-
er Spinoza’s ‘metaphysic takes “substance” not to be a count noun like “pebble” 
but rather a mass noun like “water”.’ However, both of these options are nouns, 
whereas I would rather characterize substance as a verb — substance acts, exists, 
produces, maintains, and so on. This way substance can be seen as the fundamen-
tal principle of acting, existing, persevering, etc. My point is that the notion of 
substance is far too easily conceived in terms of an inert thing, and in Spinoza’s 
case we should avoid doing this.
35 Bennett, 1984, 106, 108-9; 2001, 148
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metaphysic in itself does not necessarily lead to the idea of substan-
tial power, I argue that starting from Spinoza’s premises substance can 
be quite naturally seen as a fi eld of activity, and the fact that the fi eld 
metaphysical interpretation can be quite seamlessly combined with 
the dynamistic aspects of Spinoza’s thought gives additional support 
to it. Moreover, as Bennett holds, fi eld metaphysical interpretation of 
substance monism is certainly not without its merits: besides showing 
how the overall relation between extended substance and fi nite bodies 
should be adequately conceived, it provides solutions to such trouble-
some philosophical problems as corporeal annihilation and co-location 
of bodies.36 But it is preferable to see the fi eld as a fi eld of intensifi cation 
patterns, not of some other kind of properties, for they are not only 
compatible with Bennett’s analysis of motion but, most importantly, in 
line with Spinoza’s dynamistic tendencies, and this provides us a view 
of extension as a fi eld where modifi cations resist and aid each other in 
their striving to occupy spatial regions.
My interpretation rests on the contention that Spinoza’s central aim 
was to give solid metaphysical moorings to the new mechanistic phys-
ics, for this is the only way the most important question of our ethi-
cal position in the post-Aristotelian world can be justifi ably answered: 
‘[T]he Ethics … must be based on metaphysics and physics’ (Ep27). 
And I side with Bennett in holding that Spinoza was indeed deeply in-
novative, profound, and bold in dealing with these hard fundamental 
questions. However, it is likely that Spinoza did not succeed in every 
respect in presenting his metaphysical views in as thorough manner as 
he would have preferred. For example, the letter to Tschirnhaus dis-
cussed above shows that after denying that matter could be defi ned 
through extension, and claiming that it must be ‘explicated through 
an attribute which expresses eternal and infi nite essence,’ he adds that 
‘perhaps, if I live long enough, I shall some time discuss this view with 
you more clearly; for as yet I have not had the opportunity to arrange 
in due order anything on this subject’ (Ep83). Only seven months later 
he was already dead, and the exposition presenting ‘in due order’ these 
demanding matters was never written. Nevertheless, the basic onto-
logical principle of active power, which is expressed in different forms, 
can be seen clearly enough at work in the Ethics and makes it possible 
to disclose what he had in mind.
As mentioned above, fi eld metaphysical interpretation of Spinozistic 
ontology does not necessarily entail physics of matter in motion, but I 
shall argue that Spinoza’s physics is nevertheless in consonance with 
36 See Bennett, 1984, 97-106; 2001, 144-5
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the fi eld metaphysic of power, and can even give support to it. Indeed, 
I want to show that one of the main strengths of the viewpoint of power 
is how well it allows us to deal with Spinoza’s physics and theory of 
individuation, providing us with a fresh perspective to his theory of 
individuality.
IV   Field metaphysic and physical individuality
The ‘Physical Digression’ of the second part of the Ethics (inserted be-
tween E2p13 and p14) is the unquestionable basis of Spinozistic physics 
of matter in motion. Spinoza presents in it a compelling theory of indi-
viduation for a class of physical beings he calls ‘individuals,’ and thus it 
tells us the story of what he takes corporeal things of the physical world 
to be. Hence, it should be read with care. At this point it should be 
emphasized that Bennett’s talk of ‘Spinoza’s two levels,’ metaphysical 
and physical, concern two different ways of describing the same thing, 
namely the attribute of extension — although it should be remembered 
that, in philosophical terms, the fi eld metaphysical description is the far 
more adequate one.37
The fi rst lemma of the Digression deals with the basic principles of 
physical existence. Understandably enough, it follows from Spinozis-
tic substance monism that fi nite entities cannot be distinct substances: 
‘Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and 
rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance’ (E2p13le1). 
Spinoza’s claim that bodies are identifi ed on the basis of motion and 
rest is only one of the instances where the paramount importance of the 
new concept of motion can be seen. As mentioned above, it provides an 
inevitable context for his metaphysics. What is important to note here, 
however, is that Spinoza regards motion and rest as the principle gen-
erating the variety of the physical world. He does not think of matter in 
terms of inert mass, but in terms of motion — which is in consonance 
with the dynamism of his metaphysics.
To understand Spinoza’s thought on physical individuals it is very 
important to know what he means by a fundamental class of extended 
entities he calls ‘the simplest bodies’ (corpora simplicissima), which ‘are 
distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and 
slowness’ (E2p13le3a2d). The doctrine of the simplest bodies is quite 
puzzling. If they are interpreted as the smallest possible bodies, dif-
fi culties arise. For as I have already noted, many philosophers held in 
37 Bennett, 2001, 147-8
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Spinoza’s time that all extended things, regardless of their size, are di-
visible into smaller parts, and consequently there cannot be so small a 
body that it could not be further divided. Thus, the concept of ‘small-
est possible body’ is highly problematic. However, I believe that the 
viewpoint of power can provide a solution to the problem of simplest 
bodies. Since extension is fundamentally a fi eld of power, and since 
that fi eld is divided in regard to motion and rest, simplest bodies can 
be interpreted as basic unvarying alterations of place in the fi eld.38 In 
other words, simplest bodies are, ontologically speaking, rudimentary 
intensifi cations of spatial power, or extended power quanta, that invari-
ably change place.39 The elementary constituents of the physical world 
are therefore not lumps of inert mass, but in a constant fashion moving 
intensifi cations. I take it that each simplest body has a portion of infi -
nite power belonging exclusively to it, and an extended mode’s share of 
power is determined on the basis of motion and rest. Within this kind 
of ontological framework, matter is constituted by the interaction of 
power quanta. The impenetrability of bodies stems from power quanta 
striving to occupy their region of space, thus preventing other quanta 
from entering it.40
For example, Gueroult and Don Garrett have argued that simplest 
bodies may be of different sizes.41 I agree with them, although I assume 
that in general simplest bodies must be extremely small. Furthermore, 
Spinoza was no atomist, and the earlier discussed example of water 
that can be always divided without any kind of real division in sub-
stance (E1p15s; KV I.ii, § 21) makes it quite clear that simplest bodies 
are not to be understood as indivisible particles. So, each simple body 
fi lls its region of space, and even if space were so modifi ed that a simple 
body would be divided into two halves, the result would be simply 
38 I disregard the possibility of simplest bodies at rest for the following reason. Sim-
plest bodies are ‘distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed 
and slowness’ (E2p13le3a2), and this obviously implies that there could be at most 
only one simplest body at rest; since this kind of doctrine of the single unmoving 
simplest body sounds pretty mysterious, I consider it best to think of all the sim-
plest bodies as moving.
39 Pietarinen originally introduced the useful term of power quantum to the context 
of interpreting Spinoza. However, by the simplest bodies he means the smallest 
possible quantities of power under the attribute of extension (Pietarinen, 2000a, 
197).
40 It is perhaps interesting to note that these views are in many ways similar to those 
Kant presents in his Physical Monadology (see Kant, 1992 [1756]).
41 Garrett, 1994, 81-2; Gueroult, 1974, 161, 163
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two smaller regions of the same constant motion.42 Spinoza’s point is to 
describe the most rudimentary level of the distribution of motion and 
rest, not to support any kind of atomism.
Just after considering the simplest bodies, Spinoza gives us the defi -
nition of ‘individual’:
When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so con-
strained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they so move, wheth-
er with the same degree or different degrees of speed, that they communicate their 
motions to each other in a certain fi xed manner, we shall say that those bodies are 
united with one another and that they all together compose one body or individ-
ual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies. (E2p13le3a2d; 
the fi rst emphasis added)
This means that individuals under the attribute of extension are com-
plex bodies, composed of many other bodies — and in the end, of 
simplest bodies (or power quanta).43 Furthermore, the identity of an 
individual depends on ‘a certain fi xed manner’ that bodies ‘communi-
cate their motions to each other.’ What does Spinoza have in mind? The 
following lemma clarifi es things:
If the parts composing an individual become greater or less, but in such a propor-
tion that they all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to each other as before, then the 
individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form. 
(E2p13le5; emphasis added)
Many commentators have emphasized the central importance of fi xed 
relations (ratio) in Spinoza’s theory of individuals, and rightly so. Obvi-
ously, the relation of simplest bodies — or in metaphysical terms, the 
relation of extended power quanta — is decisive for the identity of com-
posite extended entities. The importance of relationality can be seen as 
stemming from the fi eld character of Spinozistic metaphysics: distribu-
tion in the unifi ed fi eld of power is always relational, and established 
by the way the intensity of power is dispersed between different spatial 
regions. I interpret this to mean that the metaphysical description of an 
individual involves a fi xed arrangement of interaction between power 
42 Hence I agree with Lee Rice (1971, 647) that ‘the corpora simplicissima are quite 
divisible.’ Gueroult (1974, 161), too, makes essentially the same point: as parts of 
extension, simplest bodies must be divisible, without, however, being aggregates 
of parts. 
43 See E2p13le7. Garrett (1994, 93-4) wonders whether simplest bodies are individu-
als; I think that only complex bodies are individuals, and that simplest bodies are 
just basic constituents of individuals. 
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quanta; and that at the physical level of description this equals the rela-
tion of motion and rest between the bodies composing the individual.
Spinoza speaks of the structure (fabrica) of the human body in several 
places (E1app, 3p2s, 4p59s), and consequently it may be fi tting to think 
of complex bodies as concrete kinetic structures, constituted by innu-
merable simple bodies in the required interactive confi guration. And 
although Spinoza suggests in the Short Treatise (II.Pref., § 12) that the 
relation characterizing an individual can be expressed as mathematical 
ratio — such as 1 to 3 — between the sum of motion and the sum of rest 
of the individual’s parts, I do not think that such a simple numerical 
proportion tells the whole story concerning kinetic structures that are 
spatial by nature.44
To sum up, I would like to draw a more comprehensive picture of 
Spinoza’s theory of individuality. First, since individuals are not sub-
stances but modes of substance, there must be something that deter-
mines the way infi nite attributes of the one substance are modally, and 
not really, divided. I agree with Matheron that individual essences are 
one of the indubitable starting points for Spinoza.45 Obviously, their 
importance lies in the fact that a fi nite thing’s essence is the basis for 
individuating that thing (see E2d2), and in the context of my interpre-
tation this means that individual essences determine the arrangements 
of intensity in motion without which certain intensifi cations fi lling re-
gions in the fi eld of power would not be distinguished as individuals. 
In physical terms, the relation of motion and rest between simpler bod-
ies gives unity to an individual; we may call this, following Matheron, 
the formal element of individuality.46 Together, all the essences form a 
timeless order, produced according to the laws of God’s nature. Sec-
ond, there must be something actual that constitutes the individual in 
temporal reality, namely the concrete power quanta of which an actual 
complex mode is composed. Correspondingly, Matheron calls the sim-
pler physical bodies out of which a complex body is formed the material 
element of individuality.47
These considerations imply that from the metaphysical point of view 
there are (1) eternal essences that specify certain spatial arrangements of 
44 For more about relations as mathematical ratios, see Garrett, 1994, 82–7. Garrett 
(1994, 87) comes close to my position by claiming that ‘ratios of motion and rest 
are simply fi xed patterns of communicated motion and rest among parts.’ See also 
Ablondi and Barbone, 1996, 79; Barbone, 2002, 98; Jonas, 1979 (1965), 267.
45 Matheron, 1988 (1969), 9-10, 18
46 Matheron, 1988 (1969), 39
47 Matheron, 1988 (1969), 38; for a similar view, see Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 205-6, 208. 
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intensity as individuals, and (2) actual individuals, i.e. relatively stable 
concrete structures of power quanta that realize these arrangements in 
temporality. However, one can still ask how a certain arrangement of 
intensity can belong to a certain essence. I am willing to suggest that 
essences could be seen as blueprints or diagrams that pick out certain 
patterns of intensifi cations as individuals.48 This suggestion fi nds sup-
port from the Spinozistic theory of defi nition: there is a defi nition for 
each individual, a defi nition expressing the essence of the individual 
defi ned (TIE, § 93; E1p8s2). And not only does a defi nition include the 
cause producing the individual, but all the individual’s properties can 
be deduced from it as well (TIE, § 96). As Matheron puts it: ‘To under-
stand a thing is to know how to produce it.’49 And since defi nitions 
express essences, it is possible to think of essences as blueprints for the 
composition of actual individuals. However, since Spinoza does not ad-
dress this topic, I prefer to leave the question open.
V   Persistence and conatus
Formal essences do not come and go out of existence (E2p8, 2p8c), but 
an individual’s actual being begins and ceases at certain temporal mo-
ments. I agree with Deleuze that a mode exists actually when it possess-
es the extended parts that correspond to its eternal essence,50 although 
I consider it inexact to talk about modes as if they were entities that 
owned extended parts. An actual complex mode is a certain concrete 
structure of ‘parts.’ And so, an individual’s temporal existence can be 
seen as a state of affairs where concrete power quanta are organized in 
the arrangement corresponding to the individual’s essence. 
According to the corollary of E1p24, God is the cause both of (1) 
things’ beginning to exist, and (2) their persevering in existing. For an 
individual to begin to exist the right arrangement of concrete power 
quanta is required, and this is produced by causal effects of other fi nite 
things (E1p28). Because essences exist eternally, the temporal moment 
of the beginning of actual existence depends solely on the interrelation 
of actual power quanta. This is the way that the eternal and the tempo-
ral work together in actuality.
48 Cf. Barbone (2002, 98): ‘This pattern can even be imagined as a “blueprint,” that 
is, as a “construction guide” by which to arrange the necessary parts to form the 
individual.’
49 Matheron, 1988 (1969), 12; translation mine.
50 Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 202; see also Deleuze, 1988 (1981), 76.
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But what about the persistence of existence? This concerns the prob-
lem of individual identity through time: how does Spinoza explain the 
continuity of individual existence? To begin with, it is very interesting 
to observe that according to Spinoza, it does not matter which particu-
lar parts comprise a physical individual (for example a human body) 
at a given time:
If, of a body, or of an individual, which is composed of a number of bodies, some 
are removed, and at the same time as many others of the same nature take their 
place, the individual will retain its nature, as before, without any change of its 
form. (E2p13le4)
As is well known, a great portion of any human body is renewed sev-
eral times during its lifetime. Interpreted from the viewpoint of power, 
a human body is constituted by an extremely complex arrangement 
of power whose quanta or parts must remain in a certain fi xed rela-
tion for the body’s temporal existence to continue. So, when a mode 
moves or its parts change (E2p13le4–le7), this requires extremely rapid 
re-organization in the fi eld of power — the regions the mode fi lls often 
change completely. To illustrate this, we can consider for example a ten-
nis ball moving swiftly across a tennis court. The ball (i.e. a determinate 
physical-kinetic structure) is, metaphysically speaking, a spatial pat-
tern of power quanta. And from this it follows that as the ball moves 
the quanta that constitute it occupy continually new regions of space, 
but in such a fashion that despite this continual spatial alteration, the 
power quanta are maintained in the arrangement corresponding to the 
essence of the tennis ball. In other words, the unifi ed power fi eld alters 
so that subsequent regions are fi lled by the pattern of intensifi cation 
physically conceptualized as the ball. Thus, the infi nite spatio-temporal 
fi eld of power is in a state of fl ux, ceaselessly re-ordered, while power 
as a whole stays the same.51
If the power quanta that constitute a human being, for instance, can 
frequently move and change, it must be asked how it is possible that 
they nevertheless remain in a particular interrelation or arrangement. 
Why, for example, does a highly complex human body continue its ex-
istence for a prolonged time and not simply disintegrate? In order to 
answer this question it is necessary to connect the considerations of the 
51 In the famous E2p13le7s Spinoza considers the whole of nature as ‘one individual, 
whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infi nite ways, without any change of the 
whole individual.’ I interpret this to mean that extended nature as infi nite power 
does not alter, although as it is distributed through the eternal order of essences 
the temporal reality varies without end.
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Physical Digression to Spinoza’s famous doctrine of conatus, presented 
in the third part of the Ethics: individuals persevere in existence due 
to the eternal essence as actual conatus (E3p6–3p7), or striving to per-
severe in being. In other words, a thing’s essence in temporal reality 
has conatus nature. The essential conatus power, the basic striving to 
persevere in being, explains why the pattern of power that forms the 
individual is held together from one moment to another—even if in the 
fi eld of power its location (and in some respects its character) would 
alter.52 This stability of arrangement equals the fi xed relation of motion 
and rest Spinoza discusses in the Physical Digression.
Garrett is right in holding that Spinoza’s theory of physical individu-
ality provides specifi c content to the doctrine of self-preservation. My 
position is close to Garrett’s also in that we both hold, like many other 
scholars, the maintenance of the continuing ratio or pattern of motion 
and rest to be the proper activity of the individual that has a certain 
nature.53 Without the conatus character of its essence an individual body 
would not have any continuity of actual existence, but would be imme-
diately disintegrated — just as physical motion according to the principle 
of inertia would not be possible without the conatus power behind it. Hence, 
the conatus doctrine is one of the most profound aspects of Spinozistic 
dynamism and naturalism, in which human beings also are necessar-
52 As an anonymous referee of this journal pointed out, since any complex thing’s 
simpler parts are powers to cause effects, the question concerning persistence of 
such individuals can be stated as, ‘why do these powers remain bundled?’ And it 
seems superfi cial just to reply that there is a striving power to maintain the indi-
vidual’s existence, for then it may be asked, what keeps that power bundled with 
the others. It is unclear whether Spinoza can give a satisfactory answer to this 
problem, but his view is obviously that conatus is not so much one power among 
others as the character or direction of things’ power: in temporal reality of resis-
tances and hindrances, any entity’s power is manifested as striving to keep the 
complex thing’s essence instantiated, which means that Spinozistic things’ power 
is exerted against destructive external causes. On what grounds can Spinoza claim 
that temporal things’ power is such striving is another matter and depends on how 
one interprets the proof of the conatus proposition (E3p6d), but that demonstration 
seems to turn on the idea that a proper notion of power implies that in case of 
opposition, a thing endowed with power truly resists opposing factors and does 
not simply cease its causal activities whenever facing obstacles (for more on this, 
see Viljanen, forthcoming). However, as complex things are formed out of simpler 
things, this leaves open the question of how should the relationship between the 
striving of a complex individual and the strivings of its simpler parts be conceived; 
in any case, Spinoza seems to think that a complex thing’s essence, together with 
the thing’s striving power, has a particular nature not simply derivable from the 
simpler entities’ essences or powers. Related to this, see Ep32 and below.
53 Garrett, 1994, 97
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ily part of nature. Moreover, Spinoza introduces the notion of power 
in the admittedly highly abstract fi rst part of the Ethics, but later on he 
links it up with our experience, suggesting that power is something we 
are familiar with: desire, one of the three basic emotions, is a form of 
conatus, i.e., expression of the one and the same God’s power operat-
ing everywhere (E3p6d) of which we are aware (E3p9s). Thus as our 
desires involve consciousness of power, we become acquainted with 
God’s power through them.54
We can take a look at the famous letter including the analogy of ‘a 
tiny worm living in the blood’ in order to further illustrate the role of 
conatus. There Spinoza writes that ‘all the parts [of the blood] are con-
trolled by the overall nature of the blood and compelled to mutual ad-
aptation as the overall nature of the blood requires, so as to agree with 
one another in a defi nite way’ (Ep32; emphases added). I take this to mean 
that blood’s nature has conatus character that forces simpler parts to the 
relation corresponding to blood’s essence, making blood a harmonious 
(i.e. consistent) individual capable of persevering in being. No doubt, 
this ‘controlling’ and ‘agreement’ requires constant activity that distin-
guishes an individual from a mere aggregate of fi nite things.55
A timeless individual essence determines what kind of arrangement 
of power conatus must maintain in order to constitute the individual; 
and since intensifi cations of power are always in motion, this arrange-
ment equals the stable relation of motion and rest. As Deleuze com-
ments, ‘mechanism does not exclude the idea of a nature or essence of 
each body, but rather requires it, as the suffi cient reason for … a given 
proportion of movement and rest.’56 I believe that this is not too far from 
Gueroult’s position: although he opposes combining conatus doctrine 
with the Physical Digression, he does end up stressing the ‘metaphysic 
of essences’ underlying Spinozistic physics.57 Gueroult also rightly pro-
claims Spinoza as a forerunner of Leibniz in the sense that also for Spi-
noza the purely mechanistic and relational physics is subordinate to the 
dynamic internal powers of individuals.58 
54 I am grateful to Olli Koistinen for helping me in developing this point.
55 Many commentators have drawn attention to this; see e.g. Barbone, 2002, 96-7, 100; 
Rice, 1971, 648, 654.
56 Deleuze, 1997 (1968), 228
57 Gueroult, 1974, 187–8. Insofar as Gueroult’s point in keeping conatus apart from 
physics is simply that conatus as a metaphysical principle cannot be an element of 
physical reality, I have no objection to it.
58 Gueroult, 1974, 187-9. Seen from this perspective, Spinoza’s physics presented in 
the Digression is rather a carefully thought-out theory where ‘mechanistic phys-
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If we keep in mind the conatus character of our essential power (E3p6, 
3p7) — the striving to maintain a certain pattern of power quanta — to-
gether with the thesis that an individual’s actualization is caused sole-
ly by other modes (not by the individual’s conatus) (E1p24, 1p28), the 
emerging picture of modes, and thus also of human beings, is highly 
compelling. Because the existence of any human being is produced 
by the necessity of causal laws, without any kind of teleology (E1p17, 
1app, 4pref), substantial power does not consciously strive to form pat-
terns that would correspond to certain individuals’ eternal essences. 
But when an individual’s eternal essence is actualized in duration by 
other modes, substantial power as conatus in a sense ‘grabs hold of’ the 
formation that corresponds to the individual’s eternal essence. This is 
the moment when, for example, a human being is born and the striving 
to maintain her existence begins. The essential conatus power explains 
why the pattern of power that constitutes our body is renewed or re-
generated constantly from one moment to another. However, our per-
severing conatus power is limited, and there comes a time when it can 
no more oppose the decomposing external powers, and the structure of 
our body is no longer renewed. As a result, no region in the power fi eld 
corresponds to our essence — an event more familiarly called death 
(see E4p3, 4p39s). Of course, power that used to be arranged in a man-
ner called ‘a human being’ does not disappear; it is simply re-distrib-
uted anew.
VI   Conclusion
I have argued above that Bennett’s fi eld metaphysical interpretation is 
basically right and that it can be fruitfully combined with a dynamistic 
view of Spinozistic substance. Contrary to what has been sometimes 
claimed, it is by no means out of place or strange to approach Spinoza’s 
thought this way: if we start from the idea of some basic stuff — be it, 
for instance, mass, temperature, electrical strength, or power — that is 
distributed continuously and variably throughout the unique and uni-
fi ed extension, we arrive at a conception of spatial reality as a fi eld.59 
With respect to Spinoza, what emerges from this point of view are fi nite 
ics and rigorous metaphysics reciprocally imply and interpenetrate one another’ 
(Lecrivain, 1986, 58) than a mere ‘placeholder for a detailed biological theory that 
still lay in the future’ (Bennett, 1984, 107). Cf. also Ablondi and Barbone, 1996, 83.
59 Here I am leaning on Mark Wilson’s (1998, 668) formulation: ‘A physical quantity 
(such as mass, temperature or electrical strength) appears as a fi eld if it is distrib-
uted continuously and variably throughout a region.’
416 Valtteri Viljanen
things as modes that can be described as formations of intensity in the 
unifi ed fi eld of power. The rudimentary physical entities, simplest bod-
ies, result from constantly moving quanta of power that strive to fi ll 
their regions of space. These basic constituents of physical reality form 
complex entities whose metaphysical essence not only individuates 
certain formations of dynamic intensifi cations as individuals but also 
strives to maintain their temporal existence. As long as our essential co-
natus can battle the disintegrating effects of external causes, a certain re-
gion of space remains identifi able as our body; further, the character of 
our existence is determined by the relation between our power and the 
other powers in the fi eld. And so, it is only fi tting that Spinoza’s ethical 
project is inherently dynamistic, aiming to provide us with strategies of 
reason that help our essential power be realized as freely as possible in 
this fi eld of constant contest.60
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